Thursday, September 26, 2013

Knowledge and Knowledge Creation (Campbell and Database Tools)


The third exploratory and our class discussion helped me think more about knowledge creation, particularly how the authors think knowledge is created. In this post, then, my purposes are twofold. First, I want to show how I see the concept of knowledge creation complicated in Campbell (I could make this assertion about Vico too, but because I am going to do an analysis of several kinds of knowledge creation - and this is a post rather than a seminar paper - I will concentrate on just one author.) Second, I want to elucidate how the databases helped me think about knowledge that we create with and from texts.

(Purpose 1) Campbell had complex understanding of knowledge creation.

Campbell does not emphasize any one kind of knowledge creation. Instead, he creates a complex network of different kinds of knowledge creation, including situated knowledge, embodied knowledge, communal knowledge, experiential knowledge and rational knowledge. (Note: I want to acknowledge that these knowledges are not necessarily completely separate. My intention in naming and separating the knowledges is to use the knowledges as a vehicle for my exploration.) Below, I will start each section with a definition in order to add context to how I understand and will be using each knowledge. (Another note: I recognize that I use very simplified definitions; however, they give me a starting point.) Then, I will illustrate how Campbell alludes to each knowledge. (Yet another note: I use ideas, propositions and knowledge as synonyms. While ideas and/or facts are not necessarily knowledge, I am going to work under the assumption that ideas and/or facts can become knowledge or can be evidence of knowledge.)


Situated knowledge

Situated knowledge is knowledge made within a specific context - historical, social, cultural, etc. Due to its dependence on context, situated knowledge does not easily (if at all) allow the belief that knowledge is universal (meaning “one” or “whole,” rather than “permanent”).

 “The term reasonableness, when used in this manner, means nothing but the goodness, the amiableness, or moral excellency. If therefore the hearer hath no love of justice, no benevolence, no regard to right…your harangue could never have any influence on his mind” (928). Campbell takes a term that one may assume has a universal meaning and explains that a certain person may have a completely different understanding (or no understand at all, perhaps) of this term. The audience’s understanding of the term will be situated in their dispositions and beliefs (“no love of justice, no benevolence, no regard to right”), which are determined historically, socially, culturally, etc. As such, a rhetor could not help the audience build knowledge if he was working from the above definition of reasonableness. The opposite is true as well. If the rhetor was talking to an audience who held the same definition of reasonableness as he did, he would be able to help them build knowledge using that definition.

Communal knowledge

Communal knowledge is knowledge that is made through interaction with others and/or decided by community.

“[I]t hath become a common topic with rhetoricians, that, in order to be a successful orator, one must be a good man…Consequently, the topic hath a foundation in human nature” (937). This quotation implies that if an idea (a piece of knowledge) becomes accepted by a community (“become a common topic”), it will become part of the communities “foundational” knowledge. In other words, knowledge can be built from a community’s use of and agreement on that knowledge.

Furthermore, Campbell indicates communal knowledge in his assertion that audiences differ from each other. “Now, the difference between one audience and another is very great, not only in intellectual but in moral attainments” (936). The language of “one audience” has a communal connotation. In many other places in his text, Campbell uses the term “hearers,” which could be interpreted as a collection of individual hearers. In this sense, one individual is not necessarily from the same community (and, thereby, have the same knowledge) as the other individual hearers in the audience. The switch to audience (rather than hearers) may suggest a community; this is emphasized by the adjective “one.” “One” implies unity and, in this case, suggests a unified audience that believes (“moral attainments”) and creates knowledge (“intellectual attainments”) in conjunction. This idea of audience as one appears on page 924 as well: “if the ideas introduced be either through the sphere of their knowledge” (924 italics added). The use of “their” suggests a collectively held knowledge among the audience. This is important because it emphasizes distinct communities that can make knowledge together. While Campbell acknowledges that some ideas are widespread (like a rhetor being a good man), the emphasis on individual audiences suggests that knowledge (or at least some of it) is not simply universal. Rather, it can differ among communities because each community makes its own communal knowledge.

Rational knowledge

Rational knowledge is created and held in the mind of a single person. This kind of knowledge creation excludes the senses; instead, knowledge is created “through [overt] instruction, study, or practice” (Oxford English Dictionary).

When discussing mathematical induction, Campbell writes that “the perception of our clear and adequate ideas can be no other than what the mind perceives them to be” (908).  Using “the” before mind implies singularity and specificity. Thereby, the language suggests that ideas (knowledge) are held within the specific individual’s mind. Campbell also does not address the senses in the entirety of the “Mathematical Axioms” section, which implies that the senses are not important in this kind of induction. Finally, the examples used in the mathematical induction section are propositions (knowledge) learned from overt, formal instruction, such as “Thirteen added to seventeen make thirty” (908). Taken together, these ideas suggest that (at least in mathematical induction) knowledge is created rationally.

Experiential knowledge

Experiential knowledge is knowledge that is gained through experience.

Campbell explains that after experiencing something through the senses multiple times, we start to “[anticipate] the appearance of the customary consequence;” this, he says, is “called Experience” (915). It is by this process of repetition (experience) that “the mind a habit of retaining [facts];” the retention of facts is evidence of knowledge creation (915). This is supposed in that Campbell specifically links the words “experience” to “knowledge”: “For it is principally to the acquisitions procured by experience that we owe the use of language, and the knowledge of almost every thing that makes the soul of a man differ from that of a newborn infant” (914). Experience gives us language, which leads to knowledge.

(Because language is a necessary part of knowledge making, communal and rational knowledges could be implied in the latter quotation also well. In terms of communal knowledge, language allows us to communicate communally, which can allow us to form knowledge together. Meanwhile, for rational knowledge, language could be used to receive formal instruction. Language could also allow us to think to ourselves, and thereby, form knowledge internally.)

Embodied knowledge

Embodied knowledge is knowledge that is created through the body, or, for Campbell, through the five senses.

Campbell discusses the senses quite often throughout his text and associates the senses with knowledge making. “The senses, both external and internal, are the original inlets of perception. They inform the mind of the facts, which in the present instant are situated within the sphere of their activity” (914). The OED defines perception as “consciousness [and] understanding,” which are also synonyms for knowledge. So, the senses are the “inlets” of knowledge. The phrase “inform the mind of the facts” suggests knowledge creation as well. The senses are giving the mind information that can be turned into knowledge if the facts are repeated and remembered.

(Campbell alludes to situated knowledge here as well. Because the facts are “situated,” the knowledge gained from the senses is situated in the context of “their activity” as well.)

Complex understanding of knowledges

That all these knowledges are present in his text shows that Campbell does not nail down one concept of knowledge creation. Instead, by alluding to a variety of knowledges, he seems to suggest that different knowledges are applied to different situations and/or that they can be simultaneously present.

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(Purpose 2) The database tools, used without having read the text itself, can create a flat (possibly incorrect) reading; however, if read in conjunction with the text itself, the tools may enable us to complicate our reading of the texts. Thus, in combining the tools and the entirety (or at least a sizeable chunk) of the text, we can create a deeper knowledge with and from the text.

To think about knowledge creation with the database tools, I used Alex, Ngram and Wordle (taking a page from “Custer and McNease”’s book) to look at the use of “knowledge” within Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning. (For space reasons, I will only discuss the Alex visual representation, but I would be able to make the same arguments with Ngram and Wordle.)

First, I thought about the tools imagining I had not read the text yet. From the above visual, we see that knowledge links with the mind, which also like with the body. A person might conclude that Bacon thinks that knowledge is created and stored in the mind (a belief in rational knowledge). In this conclusion, she might argue that the linkage of mind to body is only indicating that the mind is part of the body or could refer to “body” of a text or “body” of knowledge. She might also support this conclusion by emphasizing the link between “knowledges” and “rational”; to support this, she might use a definition of rational in the OED, “a person who takes a rationalist view.” On the other hand, a person might make an argument for Bacon’s belief in embodied knowledge. Here, the use of “body” might relate to the senses and to knowledge creation through the senses. That “mind” is linked first simply means that knowledge is stored in the mind. This person might use a different definition of rational from the OED, “the power or faculty of reason.” Reason, she might say, does not need to be formed within the mind only. Regardless of the strengths/weaknesses of these arguments, we can see that one could form an argument for two different knowledges. This means that, without the context of the text, we don’t get a sense for how Bacon understands knowledge.

Now, let’s move to using the tools with context from the text. When I first read Bacon, I got the sense of a rationalist view of knowledge. However, with the use of the tools, I am given a place to start complicating my understanding of the text and begin to find places of complexity or contradiction in reference to knowledge in Bacon’s text. For example, I could start studying how Bacon uses “body” (possibly utilizing Alex’s concordances), which I would not have considered before studying the visual. Using the tools and the readings together, then, I can do two things: (1) I can complicate my understanding of Bacon – creating knowledge with the text - and (2) I can use Bacon and these tools to reflect on my own conception of knowledge and knowledge creation – creating knowledge from the text.

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