Part of my task in working on the trace was to discuss the
rhetor as a cultural lens. In doing so,
I examined the following quote: “A statement is persuasive and credible either
because it is directly self-evident or appears to be proved from other
statements that are so” (Aristotle 183).
In the quote’s explanation, I wrote that, in addition to being evidence
that the rhetor is grounded in a cultural context, the quote might also be evidence
of knowledge making. When the topic came
up in class, I had meant to bring up this point, but realized that I, although
the idea made sense to me, I was not yet sure how to articulate it. As such, I would like to use this additional
reflection opportunity to expand and slightly complicate my claim.
According to Aristotle, an argument begins with “notions
possessed by everybody” (180). In other
words, an argument begins with knowledge that everyone holds and believes in. The
rhetor then reasons forward to his argument by creating a relationship between
what is already known and what is new.
Aristotle himself does this in Rhetoric. He begins a section on enthymeme by stating
that “with regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof; just
as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent
syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric” (182). Here he begins with a notion – or knowledge –
that his audience presumably already believes: that dialectic uses both
induction and syllogism. Considering
this audience is probably his students, it is not unreasonable to think that
they would be familiar with dialectic.
Once he has established a familiar notion, Aristotle provides the
relationship of similarity between dialectic and rhetoric or between old and
new information: both use syllogism and induction. Finally, Aristotle provides new information:
“I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism and the example a rhetorical
induction” (182).
Aristotle is able to create knowledge not just by providing
new information, but by persuading his audience of its probability or its truth. Once the audience is convinced, this new
information becomes part of the “notions that everybody possesses,” allowing it
to become the basis for additional knowledge.
The argument I make here equates knowledge and notions, an aspect of my
argument on which I am still working.
Aristotle writes that “argument based on knowledge implies instruction,
and here are people who one cannot instruct.
Here, then, we must use, as our modes of argument and persuasion,
notions possessed by everybody” (180).
Does he mean here that these people – these popular audiences - cannot
have knowledge? Or simply that their
knowledge must come from these propositions?
The question really asks about the intellectual separation between
audience and rhetor, a question that Quintilian might have enjoyed and one that
is important to me, but one that I will not address in this already lengthy
blog post, lest a critical blog post become a critical essay.
The argument that I have presented here leaves me with two
questions. First, in terms of Aristotle,
what is the relationship – in terms of knowledge – between the rhetor and the
audience? Second, is there a separation
between persuasion and creating knowledge?
This more universal question is one that I hope to answer throughout the
course, as it carries implications for my wider research interests and really
for all of the texts we read. It can be argued
that all of our texts are persuasive, even though we as students use then as
tools to learn.
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